Naval Tactics Needed in Sea Power Education by Hughes, Wayne P. Jr.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2019-11
Naval Tactics Needed in Sea Power Education
Hughes, Wayne P. Jr.
U.S. Naval Institute
Hughes, Wayne. Naval Tactics Needed in Sea Power Education.  U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, November 2019, p.12-13
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/63693
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
COMMENTARY 
N~VAl. TACTICS NEEBED IN SEA POWER EBUCATtlON 
By Captain Wayne P. Hughes Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired) 
T he recently announced goal to im-prove Navy education and train-ing for the exercise of sea power 
is very important.' Military schools and 
universities that teach sea power as is-
sues of policy and strategy must be care-
ful not to overlook the tactics end combat 
aspects of the subject. Too little is be-
ing written about winning battles. There 
are three elements ofan effective strat-
egy. First, its aims: What are our naval 
forces' goals and why? Second, its ways: 
What are the operational and campaign 
plans that can achieve the goals? Third, 
the means: What forces are available and 
what tactics can they employ to execute 
the campaigns successfully? 
THE AIMS: MARITIME 
SUPERIORITY 
If the aim of sea power is to ~n 
any p~ective enemy from going lo 
war, or to ~ the enemy at the low--.. ....,_ 
est possible level of violence if war en-
sues, then in ~y cases this aim defines 
a mnritime strategy of naval supremacy. 
But supremacy now is too ambitious to 
execute against every prospective en-
emy. A lesser goal of maritime superi-
ority sufficient to achieve sea control is 
still achievable, but superiority is becom-
ing more challenging because it means 
defeating an enemy who has the power 
to choose the time and place of attack. 
The U.S. fleet must be ever-alert to fend 
off every attack, including one that may 
come with little or no warning. 
THE WAYS: TACTICAL SKILLS 
The main difference between the educa• 
tion and training domains is I!;;· A tac-
tician must gather information needed for 
an attack and-not without risk-strike 
before the enemy can strike. Sound tac-
tics entail tactical competency, which re-
quires constant tactical drilling. Tactics 
mainly are in the realm of physical ac-
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tivity, in contrast to strategic thinking, 
which occupies the realm of mental activ-
ity. Modem tactics entail swift action and 
must be timely. The pace of strategy is 
leisurely by comparison. A navy that suf-
fers collisions with large, slow merchant 
ships is unprepared to avoid "collisions" 
with supersonic antiship cruise missiles. 
Tactical competency in ftiture battles 
must include fighting with and against 
unmanned and robotic air, surface, and 
subsurface vehicles, some of which will 
operate in swarms. It requires proficiency 
at information warfare, including offen-
sive and defensive cyber operations. The 
growing ability to gather and deliver 
vast quantities of information by many 
means of search, detection, and tracking 
demands new tools in the fast-growing 
field of artificial intelligence to sort and 
swiftly deliver the right information to 
tactical decision makers who must attack 
effectively before the enemy strikes. 
Logistics are part and parcel of tac-
tics because small and numerous forces 
must be based forward in friendly na-
tions to show U.S. support of its allies. 
Marine Corps forces in advance bases 
can threaten attacks in enemy littorals 
and should be an important component 
of 21st-century sea power, as green wa-
ters become more dangerous and short-
range surprise attacks with missiles, 
torpedoes, and mines are a growing con-
cern. Observe the role reversal; instead 
of the Navy supporting amphibious as-
saults, as was the case in the 20th cen-
tury, Marines in advance bases preposi-
tioned in friendly states will support the 
Navy's capacity to threaten an enemy's 
control of its home waters. 
THE MEANS: A MULTIFACETED 
TACTICAL EDUCATION 
Tactical competency will require a com-
prehensive plan to prepare our leaders to 
wage war and win battles. The most im-
portent task the newly appointed Depart-
ment of the Navy Chief Leaming Officer 
will have is to designate the roles of the 
education and training establishment. The 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Naval 
War College, Naval Academy, and Ma-
rine Corps University will each have dif-
ferent emphases that require clarification. 
The Chief Leaming Officer must play a 
complementary role, especially in ship-
board training and individual officer and 
enlisted competency to fight as well as 
operate and repair shipboard equipment. 
Here are five steps to a multifaceted 
tactical education: 
• The Navy must recruit and train the 
righl officers and enlisted personnel. 
What do we mean by "right"? As a mini-
mum, this means training and promoting 
more "digital sailors" to man the fleet. 
• The Navy must prepare its leaders to 
fight with the right collective blend of un-
dergraduate and graduate education. 
The current subspecialty code (P-Code) 
sy~ ~ g~ms ~tio~Toffi-
cers forpuatc education is inade-
~~ost important, rci"i-li;e officers, 
every sea tour is a payback tour, not just 
when serving in P-Coded billets. This is 
especially true for those who study sci-
ence, technology, engineering, and math-
ematics (STEM). To correct the broken 
P-Code system, the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations should ~I of retired 
Navy leaders such as Admirals Mike 
Mullen, Patricia Tracey, Henry Mauz, 
and Bill McRavcn to recommend a better 
mix of graduate education for seagoing 
line officers. That in tum will govern the 
graduate education quotas at NPS and ci-
vilian universities. 
• More line officers must attend grad-
uate school for at least 18 months to 
achieve individual core competencies. 
Nonmilitary analogues arc law school 
and medical college. NPS is devoted 
to the needs of the Navy and the armed 
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forces. The Naval War College is its 
compMion for more senior officers. 
• The service must continue officered-
ucation with short courses for combat 
readiness. Nonmilitary analogues are 
shon courses for doctors, nurses, dentists, 
and financial advisors to keep them cur-
rent on the lotest practices in their pro-
fessions. In addition to short courses, the 
Navy and Marine Corps must inculcate an 
attitude of continuous professional read-
ing and moke sure officers and senior en-
listed have time to read the best joumols, 
such as the Marine Corps Gazelle, the 
Naval War College Review, and the U.S. 
Naval Institute Proceedings. Leaders also 
should be reading books on combnt and 
tactics, such os Sandy Woodward's One 
Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falk-
lands Baille Group Commander, and en-
couraged to write articles, not to register 
complaints but to design new tactics that 
will win battles.' Finding time will not be 
easy in today's overworked Heet, so a suc-
cessful sea power strategy should include 
peacetime operational plans that do not 
overwork seagoing officers. 
• instead of advancing "pe,fect " offi• 
cers,future Navy promotion boards must 
promote ojfj_cers ";i,o ;;;lrt;&.r~ lo 
~~
11m battles at sea. They should seek out 
daring officers such as Ernest J. King, 
Chester Nimitz, Bradley Fiske, Arleigh 
Burke, Holland M. Smith, Mike Mul-
len, Patricia Tracey, Henry Mauz, and 
even William Halsey, whose bold lead-
ership wos indispensable in the Solomon 
Islands campaign before he later fal-
tered. Encourage promotion boards to re-
member heroes such as John Poul Jones, 
who said, "I have not yet begun to fight," 
and David Glasgow Farragut, who said, 
"Damn the torpedoes; full speed ahead," 
at critical junctures. The Marine Corps 
has its own examples of courageous 
leaders, including Generals Clifton 
Cates, David Shoup, and Alfred Gray. 
AN EXAMPLE: NPS SEA 
CURRICULUM 
Sea power is not achieved by a policy or 
strategy. Words do not achieve combat 
readiness, not even the words in well-ex-
pressed combat doctrine. Tactical read-
iness means training present and future 
leaders to fight in the domains of action 
and risk. 
For several decodes, NPS has been 
aware that the Hect has been losing its un-
derstanding of what is required 10 fight 
and win future battles at sea. It has tried 
and failed to make this clear to Pentagon, 
Navy, and fleet leaders. More than 15 
years ago a small coterie of career seago-
ing line officers at NPS designed a single 
curriculum with inputs from numbered 
Hect commanders' staffs. Responding to 
the direction of the.Vice Chief of Naval 
Operations, t~ ir purpose was to prepare 
young line officers to develop and execute 
naval tactics, and who, when called on, 
could win battles against any enemy. The 
focus was on a well.rounded education in 
systems engineering analysis (SEA). 
The original curriculum was 18 
months long and dense with computer 
and information warfare technology, tac-
tical end campaign analysis, engineering 
physics and weaponeering, and strategic 
principles undergirding policy. The SEA 
curriculum also has a course in naval 
tactics. The Navy successfully marketed 
the curriculum for several years, initially 
almost filling the quota of20 students. 
NPS made clear there was no need to 
P-Code billets because graduates would 
apply what they learned in every sea and 
staff tour. Unfortunately, the number of 
Navy leaders should continue their 
education with professional reading, 
Including books such as One Hund~d 
Da)'f : The Memoirs of the Falklands 
Battle Group Commander, Operational 
Researr:h for Unmanned Vehicles, USN/ 
Whee/book on Tactics, and others (see • 
footnotes for an expanded Ust of rec• 
ommended reading). 
students sent by Navy Personnel Com-
mand has dwindled, year after year . 
.!!!imple first step to restore ~ -
cal competency for sea power woul~e 
to fill every SEA curriculum bille~h 
_sarefully selected juni!lJ4)fficers ~o 
cjsmonstrnte promise as future c~m-
manding officers. The Vice Chief of Na• ..... ~
vafOperations should approve the cur-
riculum and select the students. 
Naval battles are won by tactical com-
manders who know when to act, move 
swiftly, and toke calculated risks to at-
tack first and effectively. The Navy must 
integrate tactical education into its grad-
uate school programs if it wants to pro-
duce leaders who are prepared to fight 
and win future battles. 
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